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Contents1.1 The function of liquidity management
operations
1.1.1 Monetary policy strategies and objectives
The final goal is
to maintain price sta-
bility M
onetary policy is responsible for achieving various objectives.
The macroeconomic objectives pursued by central banks may
vary on a wide scale, from promoting economic growth to delivering
price stability. The rise of monetarist theories and negative experi-
ences with high inflation have been responsible in the past decade
forthegrowingacceptanceoftheviewthatdeliveringpricestability
2
and thus ensuring predictable economic environment should be the
final goal of monetary policy.
1.1.2 Implementing policy objectives
The path to achieving the final goal is paved with a number of issues
to address. First, the instruments available for the central bank obvi-
ously do not exercise a direct influence on the final objectives.
Therefore, the authorities need to make a choice of the key eco-
nomic target variables and decide on the chain of target variables
through which monetary policy may influence the attainment of its
final goals. Second, an optimum set of instruments needs to be de-
cided which helps the central bank influence its final goal the most
efficiently via the transmission mechanism.
Central banks may
achieve price stability
via a choice of inter-
mediate targets
Various implementation strategies may lead to the achieve-
ment of the ultimate policy goal. When designing the monetary pol-
icy strategy, the choice needs to be made on how the ultimate goals
will be attained. The process of developing this strategy includes
choosing intermediate targets, implementing the forecasting mecha-
nisms and deciding on those indicators which may provide useful in-
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1 This Section of the Paper relies extensively on the handbook by Borio (1997).
2 Price stability, as a final objective, does not imply that generally central banks target a zero in-
flation rate over the longer term. Among those central banks which have explicit inflation targets,
the European Central Bank, for example, regards as acceptable inflation rates between 0–2 per
cent, while the Bank of England has a 2.5 per cent inflation target. Consequently, the ultimate ob-
jective of central banks is low and stable inflation.formation relevant for the influences of monetary policy, its final
goals and the operating environment of monetary policy, i.e. the
money and capital markets. Deciding on the central bank’s commu-
nication strategy vis-à-vis market participants is also an element
of the overall strategy framework.
Generally, the intermediate targets are economic variables
which are closely related to the ultimate goal of monetary policy and
are easier to control using central bank instruments than the final goal
itself. The choice of an intermediate target may cover the exchange
rate, the nominal income level, the nominal quantity of money, the
credit aggregates, although monetary policy may opt for inflation tar-
geting as well.
The indicators are economic variables which carry relevant in-
formation in respect of the ultimate goal. Some of these are financial
variables, such as the slope of the yield curve, money and credit ag-
gregates, bond yields, the exchange rate and other sets of policy in-
struments. Other indicators are non-financial variables, for example,
price and cost variables, indicators of aggregate demand and supply,
including the current account and surveys of market expectations.
As a rule, central banks do not directly control the economic
variables playing a role at the strategic level of implementation (indi-
cators, intermediate targets); and policy decisions on the strategy
generally are taken for horizons longer than one month (see Chart 1).
Deciding on and
operating the set of
instruments as well
as managing liquid-
ity by the central
bank belong to the
tactical level of mone-
tary policy
By contrast, operating procedures have much to do with the im-
plementation of monetary policy. This level involves the design and
operation of monetary policy instruments and the choice of operat-
ing targets, which, being more closely related to the developed set of
instruments, substitute for the missing link between the intermediate
target and the available instruments. Any short-term, but not neces-
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Chart 1
Levels of monetary policy implementationsarily overnight, money market interest rate may be chosen as the
operating target, although the central bank may adopt a rate taking
stance, which means controlling the interest rate level through the
quantity of central bank money.
Since the 1980s, central banks have increasingly adopted interest rate target-
ing instead of a quantity-oriented approach. The explanation for this is that, in a
quantity-targeting framework, the variability of short-term rates tends to be
higher, which may endanger the achievement of the intermediate goal. Another
feature has been the reduction in the maturity of the operating target. In many
countries, the authorities directly aim at the overnight rate, or, at least, they al-
low overnight rates to fluctuate within a narrow band around the interest rate
targeted at a longer maturity. There are several reasons for shortening the ma-
turity focus. First, central banks are less and less willing to interfere with the op-
erations of the market (market-oriented monetary policy), and they would like
to extract as much information as possible from current interest rate levels
about market participants’ interest rate expectations. Second, at longer maturi-
ties central banks are less able to resist speculation attached to official interest
rate changes.
Adoption of an operating target facilitates the achievement
of the intermediate and, later, the ultimate goal via the transmission
mechanism. Operating instruments can be, for example, official in-
terest rates, open market operations (e.g. repo tenders), reserve re-
quirements or direct instruments often used in the past, such as
credit, deposit or interest rate ceilings. Basically, the operating pro-
cedures deal with the implementation of policy on a daily basis,
although the planning horizon may extend to one month or even
longer.
1.2 Demand for and supply of reserves
1.2.1 Components of demand for reserves
Usually a short-term
money market inter-
est rate is chosen as
the operating target
Central banks in most countries influence their operating objective
using market-oriented instruments, which is usually any short-term
market rate.
3 They determine the conditions that equilibrate supply
and demand in the market for bank reserves. The market for bank
reserves is a very special one. The central bank is in a monopolist
position in terms of supplying reserves, so it can directly affect equi-
librium. There are two sources of commercial banks’ demand for re-
serves. On the one hand, they need liquid assets, which can be im-
mediately converted into cash so as to meet their clients’ demand
for cash and to transact their daily businesses (working balances).
On the other hand, provided that the central bank operates a com-
pulsory reserve system, banks have to comply with the reserve re-
quirements imposed by the central bank (required reserves). Com-
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3 The maturity of the operating rate may vary on a very wide scale. Some banks target the over-
night rate, others target longer maturities, i.e. those between 3 to 6 months.mercial banks may not only obtain finance from the central bank,
but from other banks as well. In the interbank market, i.e. the organ-
ised market for central bank funds, banks lend their surplus liquidity
or raise additional finance among themselves at the interbank mar-
ket rate. However, the market as a whole may only access addi-






In the absence of reserve requirements, the demand for central bank
money is equal to the demand for working balances, i.e. those re-
quired to meet settlement needs. Although, apart from some excep-
tions, central banks do not as a rule require banks to meet their set-
tlement needs using their accounts with the central bank, banks do
so for a number of reasons. These include the following:
– they have direct access to the ultimate source of liquidity,
– they can reduce credit risks (by entering into payment
transactions with risk-free participants),
– the central bank is a neutral participant from competitive
considerations.
As working balances bear no interest, to have a positive work-
ing balance at the end of the day means to incur some cost equiva-
lent to the interbank overnight rate (opportunity cost). Nevertheless,
banks tend to hold positive working balances for precautionary rea-
sons, as in this way they aim to reduce the risk of having urgently to
obtain additional liquidity at above-market interest rates owing to
the inability to meet their settlement obligations. In addition to the in-
stitutional and operational characteristics of payment and settle-
ment systems, the demand for working balances is largely deter-
mined by the terms and conditions of central bank assistance. Gen-
erally, banks would tend to keep their working balances to a mini-
mum. Whenever the settlement system enables banks to lend sur-
pluses or borrow funds after the net positions arising as a balance of
their daily transactions become known, the level of precautionary
holdings may be reduced to the minimum, even to zero. If the central
bank is willing to lend on better conditions than those of the market,
then banks may even target negative balances.
Demand for working
balances is unstable
and it reacts only
moderately to fluctu-
ations in O/N rates
Owing to the reasons discussed above, the demand for working
balances is insensitive to changes in the overnight rate within the
usual band around the expected interest rate trajectory. Reductions
in overnight rates do not themselves induce an increase in the de-
mand to hold working balances. However, at the aggregate level, the
demand for working balances may be very unstable, especially if
banks fail to efficiently manage their positions or there are technical
or behavioural impediments to the smooth redistribution of reserves
in the system. If the demand for reserves is both interest inelastic and
8 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
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daily basis is required to avoid undesired fluctuations in the inter-
bank overnight rate.
1.2.1.2 Reserve requirements
The monetary authorities use reserve requirements for a number
of reasons. Historically, these were used by central banks as a pru-
dential instrument – to ensure that banks had sufficient liquidity
in case of withdrawal of deposits. With the development of financial
markets and the reduction in compulsory reserves, this prudential
role of the instrument has lessened, and the monetary policy func-
tions of reserve requirements have come to the fore.
4
The reserve rate has
increasingly become
a tool for central bank
liquidity manage-
ment
From a monetary policy perspective, required reserves may
serve two important functions. Owing to the inelasticity of banks’ de-
mand for working balances, volatility in interbank rates may be high
in case of a twist in liquidity conditions. Reserve requirements, if ac-
companied by averaging provisions, alter the interest rate sensitivity
of banks’ demand for reserves, and they thus help manage liquidity
shocks while reducing volatility in interbank rates. Chart 2 plots
overnight rates in the euro area and the United Kingdom. While in the
euro area there is a 2 per cent reserve requirement in force and the
averaging period is one month, there is practically a zero reserve
holding requirement in the United Kingdom, with no reserve averag-
ing provisions. Whereas euro overnight rates generally are very sta-
ble, apart from the last day of the maintenance period, sterling over-
night rates show a high degree of volatility.
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 9
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Overnight rates in the euro area and the United KingdomThe other, explicitly monetary policy reason is to create stable
demand for central bank money. Stable money demand, in turn,
provides a more predictable environment for conducting central
bank open market operations, or, as the case may be, the require-
ment to hold reserves can be used to create a structural shortage of
liquidity in the market.
If required reserve holdings with the central bank are un-
remunerated or are remunerated at below market interest rates, then
reserve requirements can be regarded as a source of income from is-






banks’ demand for re-
serves
In a compulsory reserve system, commercial banks are re-
quired to hold as reserves at the central bank a percentage of cus-
tomer deposits and other liabilities. Two preconditions need to be
fulfilled in order for compulsory reserves to directly affect marginal
demand for reserves. First, it should be possible for banks to use re-
serve requirement holdings to meet settlement needs. Second, the
amount of reserves banks need to hold to comply with the reserve re-
quirement should exceed their working balance target. On those
days when banks are required to hold a given level of reserves on
their settlement accounts to comply with the reserve requirement,
they cannot have recourse to their reserve holdings as working bal-
ances, i.e. to meet their liquidity needs. In these cases, the above two
conditions cannot be met, and marginal demand for reserves is de-
termined by additional demand for reserves needed for the opera-
tions, above the reserve requirement. Banks are obliged to comply
with the reserve requirements on average over a period, ensuring
that the two conditions, noted above, are met. This opens the way for
banks to hold lower balances on their reserve accounts than the re-
serve requirement over a certain period, provided that they make
adjustments at a later stage in the maintenance period.
Within a reserve aver-
aging mechanism,
banks’ compliance
may differ from the
requirement tempo-
rarily...
If banks are obliged to comply with the reserve requirement
over a certain period, i.e. on the average of the maintenance period,
then balances held on settlement accounts may serve as a buffer in
face of unanticipated liquidity shocks, which also helps reduce the
volatility of overnight interbank rates. This means that, if there is an
additional need for liquidity in the market, then this will not result in a
rise in overnight rates, as temporary shortages can be met using the
reserve account.
...so banks may react




In the averaging mechanism, the demand for reserves is un-
changed at any point in time within the maintenance period, if the
opportunity cost of holding the given position, i.e. the overnight rate,
is expected to change little over the remainder of the maintenance
10 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
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5 This function of reserve requirements is probably the most transparent at the Bank of England,
where the required reserve ratio is theoretically zero, however, depository institutions are required
to hold a 0.15per cent non-interest-bearingdepositwith the authorities(CashRatio Deposit),in or-
dertofinancecertainexpendituresofthecentralbankfromtheprofitsgeneratedonthosedeposits.period. Under these conditions, the demand for reserves will react
very sensitively to even a slight shift in the interest rate level, so
on-average compliance acts as a buffer indeed. As the end of the
maintenance period draws near, the buffer function reduces. Expla-
nation for this is that, as time passes, cumulative reserve holdings
tend to gradually narrow commercial banks’ room for manoeuvre to
manage their liquidity, given that the number of days remaining and
hence time to adjust for the deviation from the requirement lessen.
Consequently, the interest rate sensitivity of the demand for reserves
diminishes with the reduction in time remaining until the end of the
maintenance period, and on the last day demand for reserves must
equal the sum of reserves needed to comply with the requirement
and the demand for operational reserves.
With reserve averag-




This means that, if the compulsory reserve system is such that
banks must comply with the requirement on average over a certain
period, then there is less need of active central bank liquidity man-
agement. The extent to which this is true depends on the level of re-
quired reserves, the length of the averaging (maintenance) period,
and also on how banks are willing to exploit the expected swings in




supply of reserves in
order to meet the op-
erating target
Given the characteristics of the demand for bank reserves, the
central bank’s task is to regulate the supply in order to achieve its in-
terest rate or quantitative targets. Basically, there are two aspects of
this function. First, supply and demand need to be balanced. In other
words, liquidity needs to be adjusted to demand. This is called liquid-
ity management. Second, if the central bank wishes to control the
operating variables by adjusting the supply of liquidity to demand,
then it has to emphasise this for market participants through ade-
quate communication channels. This is called signalling mecha-
nism.





In countries where, owing to some reason (for example, due
to the fixed exchange rate), there is abundant structural liquidity,
absorbing surplus liquidity created by autonomous factors consti-
tutes an area of liquidity management. The autonomous sources of
liquidity are those which cannot or can only indirectly be controlled
by central bank instruments. They include, for example, the rise
in the stock of net foreign exchange reserves and in the other items
on the assets side, or the decrease in government sector deposits
with the central bank and in the value of currency in circulation
(see Table A). If the supply of central bank reserves is higher than
banks’ demand for reserves, there is an autonomous liquidity sur-
plus.
As the stylised balance sheet of the central bank shows (Table
A), the (ex post) change in reserves depends on changes in the other
items of the central bank balance sheet, and is determined by the fol-
lowing formula:
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 11
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rities (1) +  Claims on banks (2) +  Net foreign exchange reserves
(3) +  Other net assets (4) –  Liabilities to the general government
sector (5) –  Liabilities to banks above reserves (6) –  Banknotes
and coin (8)
But the other part of
supply is controlled
by the central bank
The factors affecting the change in reserves can be categorised
into two groups. Those which the central bank cannot or can only in-
directly control (items denoted with A) and influence liquidity auton-
omously, discussed above, belong to the first group. The items un-
der the direct control of monetary policy, i.e. central bank claims on
banks and commercial banks’ deposits with the central bank above
reserves, comprise the second group. The central bank can directly
influence the supply of liquidity (reserves) through changes in these
items. Accordingly, given the demand for reserves, the supply of re-
serves can change for two reasons – first, through the effect of auton-
omous items (autonomous liquidity effect) and, second, as a result
of liquidity management, i.e. through the change in banks’ net posi-
tions vis-à-vis the central bank, excluding reserves (central
bank-generated change).
Autonomous liquidity position =  Net foreign exchange re-
serves (3)– Liabilities to the government (5)– Notes and coin
(8)+ Other net assets (4)
Central bank-generated change =  Central bank holdings of
government securities (1)+ Claims on banks (2)– Liabilities to
banks above reserves (6)
12 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
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Table A
Stylised central bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Claims on general government
(government securities)* (1)
Liabilities to general government
(A) (5)
Claims on banks (2) Liabilities to banks above
reserves (6)
Net foreign exchange reserves (A) (3) Reserves (7)
Net other**(A) (4) Notes and coin (A) (8)
Note:‘ ( A)’ denotes autonomous items from the perspective of liquidity management.
* For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the central bank does not provide finance to
general government even for the short term, and the purpose of holding government securi-
ties is solely related to liquidity management.
** Holding gains/losses from revaluation of assets and equity have been classified as net
other items.The change in net li-
quidity equals the ad-
ditional liquidity
which the central
bank has to ensure in
order to create market
equilibrium
Suppose the central bank’s aim is to maintain market balance,
i.e. to equilibrate supply and demand in the market for reserves while
keeping the level of interest rates unchanged. Then the change gen-
erated by the central bank must be equal to the difference between
the autonomous liquidity effect and the demand for reserves at a
given interbank interest rate level, (
d bank reserves), i.e. the
change in net liquidity.
Change generated by the central bank = Net liquidity position =
Autonomous liquidity position – 
d Bank reserves
The net liquidity position is equal to the additional amount
of liquidity which the central bank must ensure in order to balance
the market. An important element of liquidity management is the
forecast of the net liquidity position. If the supply falls short of the
forecast, there is a liquidity deficit, so the central bank needs
to inject additional liquidity into the system. The opposite case is a –







In principle, central banks are able to manage both liquidity
deficits and surpluses. However, a number of central banks prefer
operating as net lenders at short maturities, rather than as net debt-
ors, on the liabilities sides of their balance sheets. In addition to influ-
encing banks’ marginal demand for reserves, reserve requirements
can be aimed at raising the average level of the demand for reserves,
thereby creating a net liquidity deficit. In certain instances, monetary
policy operates only with assets side instruments at shorter maturi-
ties. Consequently, its major policy instrument is only able to create
additional liquidity, and the central bank therefore can merely influ-
ence its operating target in liquidity deficits (asymmetric systems).
In these mechanisms, central banks need to create liquidity deficits
over the longer run in order to ensure that the operation remains ac-
tive. If monetary policy operates in a liquidity deficit, i.e. on the as-
sets side, then it influences commercial banks’ marginal cost of
funds; in the opposite case, it influences the marginal rate of avail-
able investments on the liabilities side, thereby affecting movements
in returns. It is generally regarded as more useful from the perspec-
tive of the operation of the transmission mechanism, if the central
bank influences banks’ cost of funds, i.e. if it operates on the assets
side, in a liquidity deficit.
When implementing the operating framework, one of the key
objectives is to limit the volatility in interbank rates caused by the
variability of liquidity conditions. However, it is also important that
the central bank should not take over the task of managing individ-
ual banks’ liquidity, and hence it should not impede the deepening of
the interbank market and the increase in its efficiency.
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 13
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night rate may lead
to volatility of yields
serving as the operat-
ing target
A more stable overnight rate fosters the transparency of mone-
tary policy. If the variability of overnight rates spills over along the
yield curve, then this may set rates serving as the operating target
into motion as well.
6 As a result, monetary policy will lose some of its
transparency, as the change in the operating interest rate level
is also influenced by variations in the liquidity situation existing at
any given moment. With financial markets becoming international
and the mobility of capital flows increasing, exchange rate move-
ments and money market interest rates are more and more sensitive
to expectations attached to monetary policy. Thus, expectations are
gaining an increasing role in the transmission mechanism, and
the cost of false ‘signals’ also rises. The central bank amplifies its
influence on market expectations by controlling the volatility of
short-term money market interest rates. At the same time, it reduces
the danger of the market misinterpreting the reason for the change in
rates and drawing false conclusions regarding the objectives of mon-
etary policy. The more successful the central bank in accurately sur-
veying the net liquidity position, the smaller the risk of large swings
in the overnight rate. The averaging mechanism of reserve require-
ments helps reduce the volatility of the overnight rate, but certain
central bank instruments may effectively and directly curtail volatil-
ity of the overnight rate.





The instruments of central banks to manage liquidity and achieve
the operating targets (apart from the reserve requirements system)
can be grouped in different ways. They can be distinguished based
on their technical form, the frequency of their use, or whether a





Taking into account the technical form of instruments used in
the developed countries,
7 the following instruments can be distin-
guished:
(a) outright sale and purchase of government securities – The
central bank transacts in government securities in the secondary
market in order to influence liquidity. If the central bank sells securi-
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6 Consequently, the shorter the maturity of the money market rate the central bank targets, the
most it should do in order to limit interest rate fluctuations arising from the variability in liquidity
conditions.
7 With the development of money and capital markets, central banks have increasingly aban-
doned direct tools (credit and deposit restrictions, interest rate ceilings).ties, it withdraws liquidity from the system, if it buys securities, it in-
jects additional liquidity. The preconditions for the use of the instru-
ment are that a sophisticated and liquid market in government secu-
rities should exist, and that the central bank should hold enough pa-
per to trade. Here, the central bank initiates the use of the instru-
ment. This, however, is not binding for market participants.
(b) sale and repurchase agreements or repos
8 – Repo transac-
tions consist of two opposing deals, the conditions of which are de-
termined by the parties in advance. In the first leg to the transaction,
the central bank buys (sells) the security spot, while in the second
leg it repurchases (resells) the same security at a price and future
time according to the predetermined terms of the contract. The cash
flow on the two transactions equals the cash flow on a collateralised
loan. From the perspective of the central bank, a temporary pur-
chase (repo) means that the central bank supplies liquidity for the
period between the two opposing transactions; a temporary sale (re-
verse repo) means that it withdraws liquidity from the system.
9
The object of a repo deal can be a domestic security, generally
a government paper, but it may also be a security denominated in
foreign currency. In case of a temporary purchase of foreign cur-
rency, the central bank creates additional liquidity. A sale of foreign
currency, in contrast, means a withdrawal of liquidity from the sys-
tem.
(c) issue of short-term money market securities – The central
bank sells securities issued on its own in the primary market, instead
of government paper, thus it withdraws liquidity from the system for
the period remaining until maturity of the security.
(d) central bank acceptance of deposits – A common method of
withdrawing liquidity from the system is the acceptance of deposits
by the central bank. In this case, the counterparty places a deposit
with the central bank, but the central bank does not provide a collat-
eral to secure the deposit, unlike in the case of a reverse repo. (In
countries, where the reverse repo facility is in use, the security un-
derlying the transaction has a function other than collateral, as com-
mercial banks do not question the solvency of the central bank.
Rather, the security serves as a tool for banks to enter into further
transactions among themselves.)
(e) central bank lending (refinancing, rediscounting) – The
central bank may increase the supply of liquidity by direct lending to
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 15
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8 Repo is the major policy instrument in most countries.
9 For a detailed survey of repo transactions, see Szakály and Tóth (1999).commercial banks, generally against the pledge of some collateral.
Loans may be granted at a predetermined interest rate or at an inter-
est rate evolving on a tender, with the central bank having the choice
to limit the amount of loan by counterparty (refinancing line).
(f) reserve requirements – Banks are required to hold as re-
serves at the central bank a percentage determined by the reserve
ratio of deposits collected and other liabilities. The reserve require-
ment acts as a tool for liquidity management via two channels. First,
the central bank may create a structural liquidity shortage (surplus)
by raising (lowering) the reserve ratio. Second, if the banks are re-
quired to comply with the reserve requirement over a given period on
average, then reserves serve as a buffer in face of fluctuations in the
overnight rate. This is certainly the more important influence of re-
serve requirements.




facilities to be em-
ployed
If a given instrument is discretionary, the central bank decides
whether to use it or not, or how much additional liquidity to supply
or withdraw from the system. Standing facilities, in contrast, are at
the disposal of market participants, i.e. they can be activated on de-
mand by banks. The individual elements of the instruments cannot
be definitely categorised into either group. Either of them may be a
marginal source of satisfying liquidity needs or absorbing surplus li-
quidity. But banks have increasingly preferred to use discretionary
operations to make the required adjustments in marginal liquidity.
Typical discretionary tools are, for example, the outright sale or pur-
chase of securities and repurchase agreements. The role of discre-
tionary tools is becoming more and more important in liquidity
management.
10 Standing facilities are used in three areas: (i) they
are employed as safety valves to manage end-of-day imbalances,
or (ii) to maintain the upper and lower boundaries of the interest rate
corridor setting the limit for fluctuations in the overnight rate and, fi-
nally, (iii) in some cases to act as a source of subsidised intra-
marginal liquidity.
The role of discretion-
ary instruments has
been increasing
Two systems for liquidity management can be distinguished
parallel with the various categories of instrument. In the case of ac-
commodating liquidity management dominated by the use of stand-
16 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
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10 In countries with no averaging provisions, or the effect of foreign exchange market interven-
tion is difficult to forecast due to the fixed exchange rate mechanism, standing facilities continue to
have an important role.ing facilities, the central bank does not directly influence the amount
of reserves, but it stands ready to deal with commercial banks by of-
fering loans and accepting deposits at predetermined interest rates.
This approach is quite different from active liquidity management,
as movements in the quantity of liquidity are determined by the mar-
ket. Active liquidity management, i.e. that which relies on discre-
tionary tools, is becoming more and more general in countries with
developed money and capital markets. Within this operational
framework, the central bank decides how much liquidity it is ready to
supply or withdraw from the system, and it influences interest rates
via the quantity of liquidity. A precondition for the efficient operation
of active liquidity management is the accurate forecast of interbank
liquidity and the net liquidity position.
1.3.2 Regular vs. irregular operations
In countries, where reserve requirements apply on average over
a certain period, generally a distinction is made between regularly
and irregularly used instruments. Regular operations are under-
taken at a regular frequency, announced in advance. These transac-
tions generally serve the purpose of controlling mass needs
for liquidity, their timing and maturity being closely related to the
maintenance period. (Those instruments used regularly include
standing facilities as well. Standing facilities serving the steering
of the overnight rate within the corridor are offered on a standing ba-
sis.)
Operations conducted irregularly generally are given a com-
plementary role. Typically, these instruments are used in three






The most frequent area of irregular instruments is fine-tuning
within the reserve maintenance period. This type of operations is
used both to absorb surplus liquidity and to provide additional re-
sources in cases of liquidity shortages. In countries, where reserve
requirements are applied with averaging provisions, there may be a
need for ‘additional’ fine-tuning with the end of the maintenance pe-
riod drawing near, as the buffer function of reserves reduces. These
instruments may be necessary to use more frequently in countries
with no averaging provisions.
The second characteristic area of conducting irregular opera-
tions is rough tuning. These operations are designed (i) to provide li-
quidity for longer periods than those characteristic for regularly op-
erated instruments and (ii) to absorb the impact of occasional, pre-
dictable fluctuations in liquidity (e.g. seasonal influences, foreign ex-
change market intervention)
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ity shortages
Finally, irregular instruments are also used artificially to create
net liquidity deficits. Generally, this practice is followed in asymmet-
ric systems, where the central bank’s major policy instrument is only
able to provide liquidity (see above).
1.3.3 Maturity of central bank instruments
The maturity of in-
struments is deter-
mined by their use
The maturity of the instruments can vary widely depending on the
purpose for which a given instrument is used. Instruments used to
control structural liquidity, to provide medium and long-term refi-
nancing, or artificially to create liquidity shortages are of longer ma-
turity. Sometimes central banks use two instruments with different
maturities to control structural liquidity. The maturity of one instru-
ment generally extends over several maintenance periods. That of
the other ends even during the maintenance period.
Typically, the matu-
rity of instruments is
short
Typically, the instruments serving the day-to-day management
of liquidity and the major policy instruments
11 are of short maturity.
The maturity profile of the major policy instrument is consistent with
the horizon of the operating interest rate target, but the relationship
is not as close as one might think in the first instant. There is no need
to operate instruments at this maturity in order to influence the
money market rate with a given maturity. Standing facilities used to
maintain the overnight rate corridor provide the exception, as the
maturity of the instrument must be equal to that of the operating
variable.
1.4 Liquidity control and communication
The role of communi-
cation by the central
bank is becoming
more important
The implementation of monetary policy can be divided into two ar-
eas. First, by smoothing out movements in short-term interest
rates, the environment needed for the implementation of the operat-
ing target via liquidity management operations should be created.
Second, liquidity and the interest rates need to be influenced in or-
der to achieve this objective. Communication, or signalling mecha-
nisms,
12 complement, and partly substitute, this latter activity. The
role of central bank communication strategy has recently been in-
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11 The key policy instrument is the central bank tool used to achieve the operating target.
12 One extreme example for this is Switzerland, where the key policy instrument exists only
nominally.Theinterestrateannouncedontheinstrument,calledmajorpolicyinstrumentbutoutof
use in practice, serves as the policy rate. In this case, even without a change in liquidity, market
rates move in the desired direction at the appropriate signal, that is, communication has taken the
role of actively influencing the operating target.creasing. There are technical reasons for this,
13 such as the very low
elasticity and stability of the demand for working balances and the
dominant role of interest rate expectations in the demand for re-
serves. The increasing importance of central bank communication
can be traced to the broad changes in the environment of monetary
policy as well. First, central banks’ aim is to less and less interfere
with the operations of the market. Second, with a greater central
bank independence the requirement to make policy accountable
has increased. Third, the role of expectations about monetary policy
and hence the cost of false expectations have increased as a result
of the rapid development and globalisation of financial markets.
The central bank may choose to communicate via its key pol-
icy instrument or via direct press releases. It is increasingly charac-
teristic for communication strategy to announce the operating target
explicitly, i.e. in press releases, speeches or pronouncements (open
mouth policy).
The explicitness of in-
terest rate signals de-
pends on the form of
central bank opera-
tions in the market
The explicitness of signals conveyed through keynote tender
operations largely depends on the selling mechanism applied. The
clearest signal is the one that is transmitted through fixed-rate (vol-
ume) tenders. The situation is less clear-cut, if sales are conducted
through variable-rate tenders (interest rate tender), when marginal
interest rates are published ex post.
14 In this case, it is more difficult
to judge whether the outcome of the tender reflects the acceptance
by the central bank of minor fluctuations around the desired level or
difficulties of the central bank in reconciling the interest rate bids
with its liquidity management objectives.
Standing facilities
may also have a sig-
nalling role
A potential drawback in using regular tenders to convey signals
is that the central bank cannot provide any messages in periods be-
tween two tenders. This problem is particularly relevant for countries
with fixed exchange rates, where policy must react fast to changes in
market developments. In this case, interest rates announced on
standing facilities, which can be changed even between two tenders,
may be given a prominent role in communication. Generally, these
instruments can be efficient tools to complement the practice of
communicating through tenders, especially if the keynote operation
is a variable-rate tender.
It should be made
clear whether the indi-
vidual steps of the cen-
tral bank are aimed at
influencing the operat-
ing variable or just at
liquidity management
purposes
The precondition for an efficient communication strategy is
that the central bank should distinguish its measures taken for the
purposes of liquidity management from those with which it wishes to
influence its operating target. This distinction can be made clear in
two ways. One possible solution is for the central bank to act as a
price setter in one segment of the money market, e.g. in the market
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13 These were portrayed in detail in the chapter on the demand for reserves.
14 The variable rate tender does not give signals if the central bank does not announce the inter-
est rate level evolving at the tender. Generally, this happens in cases when the central bank uses the
policy instrument with the sole purpose of managing liquidity.of reserves, and to implement its operating target in this market,
while operating as a price taker in another segment (for example, the
repo market), where it implements its liquidity management objec-
tives, hardly giving information about these operations.
15 Generally,
central banks make their steps aimed at controlling liquidity as price
takers, giving as little information about these operations as possi-
ble.
As a rule, central banks’ communication strategy procedures
do not rely exclusively on one key policy instrument – most of them
use a variety of complementary tools as well. For example, standing
facilities, already noted, may be operated, but the central bank may
send signals by adjusting the conditions of a regularly operated in-
strument, i.e. by altering the quantity of additional liquidity ensured
with the given instrument, the time of its use, the maturity of the in-
strument or its price. Some central banks operate their regular in-
struments by pacing the injection of liquidity into the market. If the
use of the instrument is brought forward or postponed, or the quan-
tity of liquidity is changed, then these may transmit fine signals to
the market about the stance of monetary policy.
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15 Exactly this happens in the USA, where the FED follows its operating target in the market of





he monetary policy instruments, and particularly the liquidity
management operations, of the National Bank of Hungary basi-
cally are determined by three factors:
l. the narrow-band exchange rate regime;
2. the Bank’s major policy tool is its deposit instrument. In other
words, the Bank influences market interest rates using the liabilities
side instruments of its balance sheet;
3. the Treasury Account (in the following: KESZ) is held at the
Bank.
In the following, we will review the implications of these factors
for central bank liquidity management, and how the Bank’s policy
instruments have been adapted to these conditions.
The Bank’s interme-




16 of the Bank is to reduce inflation and to deliver
price stability. The intermediate target, in turn, is the nominal ex-
change rate or the exchange rate path. The chosen intermediate goal
for a small open economy with an around 10% inflation rate is partic-
ularly suitable for playing the role of nominal anchor. The exchange
rate directly influences the prices of tradable goods, so the pre-
announced and credible exchange rate path has a direct impact on
broad price levels and expectations, and may well be an efficient tool
of cooling down inflation expectations. Hungary introduced the
crawling-peg exchange rate regime in 1995. The forint, its exchange
rate being fully pegged to the euro since 2000, is devalued daily by
the pre-announced devaluation rate. The market rate of the currency
may depart from this value within a ±2.25 per cent wide band. The
central bank provides assistance for commercial banks at both the
ceiling and the floor of the intervention band, by buying currencies at
the ceiling and selling currencies at the floor (foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention).
The Bank’s operating
target is the 3 to 6
month interest rate
level
The operating target of the Bank is the maturity bracket which
is the most relevant for interest rate transmission, i.e. 3–6 month in-
terbank rates and government securities yields. The Bank’s interest
rate policy is aimed at maintaining an interest rate level which, in
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16 For a detailed discussion of the NBH’s objectives and the exchange rate regime, see the
Bank’s publication ‘Monetary Policy in Hungary’.harmony with the anti-inflationary objective, facilitates the mainte-
nance of external balance via its effects on savings and investment.
The consequence of a narrow-band fixed exchange rate regime
is that the central bank has to intervene quite often and in a passive
way in the foreign exchange market. Apart from the few months of
the Russian financial crisis, the forint exchange rate fluctuated prac-
tically near the ceiling of the intervention band between 1995–2000,
the Bank purchasing foreign currency and selling forints to the
amount of more than  10 billion.
17 Part of the evolving liquidity was
absorbed by the increase in the monetary base and by the govern-
ment securities market, but a substantial part flew into NBH bills and
deposits. Another consequence of the narrow-band exchange rate
system is that foreign exchange market interventions are conducted
unevenly, most often in waves, which makes it significantly more dif-
ficult to forecast liquidity.
Owing to the abun-




The abundance of structural liquidity and the occasional fast
boost of foreign exchange market intervention to liquidity make it
extremely difficult to create a liquidity deficit. This phenomenon ex-
plains the dominance of liabilities side instruments in the Bank’s pol-
icy instruments since the introduction of the crawling-peg exchange
rate regime and that a deposit facility has been chosen as the major
policy instrument (reverse repo and deposit). Since March 1999, the
Bank’s major policy tool has been the two-week deposit facility, the
interest rate announced on the instrument serving as the major pol-
icy rate. Meanwhile, this instrument has been the tool of managing li-
quidity within maintenance periods. The functions performed by the
policy instrument and, simultaneously, the form of placing deposits
have seen several changes since March 1999.
The interest rate corri-
dor acts to limit fluc-
tuations in overnight
rates
Within the instruments of monetary policy, the interest rate cor-
ridor has been given the function of limiting variations in overnight
rates around the policy rate level, in addition to reserve require-
ments. The lower boundary of the interest rate corridor is defined by
the overnight deposit rate. The Bank offers the overnight deposit as a
standing facility for credit institutions, so banks have unlimited re-
course to this facility and therefore it prevents interbank interest
rates from slipping below the central bank overnight deposit rate.
The upper boundary of the interest rate corridor is defined by the
overnight repo rate. Up to April 2001, banks had only a limited ac-
cess to funds at the overnight repo rate, up to a maximum set as a
percentage of their balance sheet totals (repo limit). Access to bor-
rowing in excess of the limit was granted by the supplementary repo
facility, at an interest rate above the repo rate.
18 In April 2001, the
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17 On the assets side of the NBH, foreign exchange reserves rose at a slower rate than this in the
period, which was the consequence that the Banks used part of currency inflows to interest pay-
ments and repayments of debt.
18Theimplementationofthelimitsystemandtherelatedintroductionofthesupplementaryrepo
was justified by the intention to defend the exchange rate regime. Without this limit in case of an at-
tackagainsttheforint,domesticbanksmayhaveaccesstounlimitedamountsofforintfunds,inad-
dition to the access to repo, the conversion of which could lead a rapid drop in reserves.Bank abolished all quantitative restrictions on repo and simulta-
neously abandoned the supplementary repo facility. The interest
rate corridor is symmetrical above and below the rate on the major
policy instrument, so the centre for any movements in overnight
rates is provided by the policy rate as well.
The quick tender is a
tool to manage unan-
ticipated liquidity
shocks
In January 1999, the Bank introduced the quick tender facility,
a tool that can be used flexibly to handle unforeseen liquidity shocks.
The quick tender was the only discretionary tool within the Bank’s
policy instruments until March 2000, when the three-month NBH bill
was introduced. There were basically two objectives with the adop-
tion of the quick tender as one of the Bank’s policy instruments. One
was to offset the effects on Hungary of unanticipated money flows,
often unexplainable by international economic developments but
linked with non-macroeconomic developments. The other was to as-
sist liquidity management and particularly to facilitate the handling
of potential liquidity shocks which may have arisen towards the last







The third fundamental factor affecting liquidity, i.e. the Trea-
sury Account held with the Bank, has the consequence that the vola-
tility of interbank liquidity increases significantly. The implication of
this for central bank liquidity management is that the influences from
fluctuations in the account of the central budget have to be cush-
ioned using central bank instruments.
International practice is divided among countries over the issue of whether the
treasury should hold its account exclusively with the central bank or with com-
mercial banks (as well). Interestingly, even the EMU member states have not
yet developed a uniform practice. Whereas in Germany, Austria, the Nether-
lands and Finland the volatility of treasury account balances held with the cen-
tral banks is so low that their effect is negligible, in Italy and Spain it is quite
large, especially at tax payment dates. Taken together, the volatility of treasury
account balances is the item among the so-called autonomous factors which
tends to affect interbank liquidity the most.
2.2 Demand for and supply of bank reserves
2.2.1 Demand for reserves: reserve requirements
Demand for reserves
is determined by re-
serve requirements
The National Bank of Hungary requires commercial banks to hold
reserves with it. Owing to the high reserve ratio, the reserve require-
ment exceeds the demand for working balances, so the system of re-
quired reserves plays a dominant role in the behaviour of commer-
cial banks’ demand for reserves. Within a reserve requirements sys-
tem, banks are obliged to hold as reserves with the central bank a
percentage of customer deposits and other liabilities (collectively:
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quired reserves apply to credit institutions. Until July 2000, all liabil-
ities constituting the monetary aggregate M3 and those nearly qual-
ifying as elements of M3 were counted towards the reserve base.
Accordingly, required reserves applied to all commercial banking li-
abilities, except banks’ equity, and interbank as well as foreign lia-
bilities. The reserve ratio was 12 per cent. Banks’ cash balances
were also covered by the reserve requirement.
Changes to required
reserves
On 1 July 2000, the Bank began to implement a two-step re-
form of the system of required reserves. The objective of this change
has been to improve commercial banks’ competitiveness and ulti-
mately to reduce the drain on earnings burdening the entire econ-
omy. Another goal has been to harmonise with the reserve system of
the European Central Bank, easing the changeover coming at a later
stage. As a result of the planned modifications, the measure of drain
on earnings in respect of forint liabilities will reduce, while that in re-
spect of foreign currency liabilities will increase by applying reserve
requirements to the entire range of short-term foreign currency lia-
bilities. Therefore, the structural disparity of banks’ liability profile
caused by the different reserve requirements imposed on foreign and
domestic liabilities will cease. The criterion for reserve requirements
will be the maturity of liabilities rather than their origin. Accordingly,
liabilities with maturities of more than two years will be exempt from
the reserve requirement. Implementation of the reform has been pro-
gressing in several steps.
As a first stage, from 1 July 2000, reserve requirements are applied to 50%
of foreign liabilities and only 50% of forint cash balances can be taken into
account to comply with reserve requirements. The nominal reserve ratio has
been reduced from 12% to 11%. As a result of the changes implemented in the
first stage, the burden imposed by reserve requirements has remained virtually
unchanged.
In the second stage of the reform, from 1 January 2001, the reserve ratio
has been reduced from 11% to 7%. With this step, the Bank has aimed to reduce
the effective reserve rate and the reserve requirement. The reduction in the re-
serve rate would have released a significant amount of liquidity, therefore, the
Bank had to ensure the absorption of the evolving liquidity, simultaneously with
taking the measure. To this end, the Bank required commercial banks to pur-
chase government securities from the Bank’s holdings equivalent to the
amount of released liquidity, parallel with the reduction in the reserve rate.
As a third stage, from 1 July 2001, reserve requirements are applied to
the full range of foreign liabilities with maturities of less than two years, and
commercial banks may not use domestic currency cash balances to fulfil the
reserve requirement. Exempt from the reserve requirement are long-term se-
curities issued by credit institutions, and mortgage bonds issued by mortgage
institutions, provided that the maturity of those securities is at least two years,
as well as foreign liabilities with maturities of more than two years.
One-month mainte-
nance period
The calculation period is one calendar month, in which the
daily average of liabilities required to be held as reserves constitutes
the basis for the reserve maintenance period. Since September
1998, the maintenance period is one calendar month, which follows
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in the preceding month serves as the base for the reserve require-
ment. Reserve requirements are complemented with an averaging
mechanism, i.e. banks are mandated to comply with the reserve re-
quirement on average over a maintenance period. Commercial
banks’ daily settlement balances are allowed to move freely, but
they are not allowed to dip into the negative. The objective of reserve
requirements complemented with the averaging mechanism is to as-
sist liquidity management by the central bank. This system helps re-
duce the volatility of overnight rates and, over the longer term, it may
assist in creating structural liquidity shortages.
The Bank publishes on the Reuters news retrieval system the
effective reserve requirement for the domestic banking sector and
compliance with the reserve requirement up to the current day.
2.2.2 Supply of reserves: factors affecting interbank
liquidity
Factors affecting fo-
rint assets of the
banking sector
It can be established based on the stylised balance sheet of the NBH
(Table B) which are those items that determine the banking sector’s
forint-denominated claims vis-à-vis the NBH:
(a) interventions in the foreign exchange market – All other fac-
tors remaining the same, foreign exchange market interventions
conducted at the ceiling of the intervention band increase, on the as-
sets side, foreign exchange reserves and, on the liabilities side, com-
mercial banks’ settlement account balances. The effect of foreign
exchange market interventions conducted at the floor of the band is
just the reverse.
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Table B
Major elements of the NBH balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Foreign exchange reserves Banknotes and coin in circulation
Claims on general government Vault cash of commercial banks










KESZ and ÁPV Rt accounts
Net other liabilities (equity, profit/loss,
items in transit, accruals, etc.)(b) changes in the balances on the KESZ (or ÁPV Rt
19)–If the
balance on the Treasury Account changes due to a transaction with
the NBH (for example, if the Bank receives interest on a government
bond), then this will not affect interbank liquidity. If, however, the bal-
ance on the KESZ changes due to a transaction entered into with a do-
mestic participant other than the Bank, then the measure of interbank
liquidity will also change. (All this is independent of the fact whether or
not the party to the transaction is a bank.) The reduction in KESZ will
increase the settlement account balance, and vice versa, an increase
in KESZ will reduce the settlement account balance.
(c) a change in outstanding refinancing loans – If a bank re-
pays a refinancing loan to the Bank, then, obviously, its claims on
the Bank will also fall, simultaneously with the reduction in its liabil-
ity to the Bank.
(d) interest payment by the central bank – Interest remuner-
ated by the central bank on required reserves and sterilisation instru-
ments expands interbank liquidity.
(e) changes in cash holdings outside banks – Cash held out-
side banks constitutes a central bank liability, similarly to the settle-
ment account. Therefore, all other central bank balance sheet items
remaining unchanged, changes in cash holdings will entail an oppo-
site change in the settlement account balance.
Fluctuations in li-
quidity always feed
through to the bank-
ing sector…
The attributes of liquidity at the micro and macro levels and their
interpretations show a number of differences. For example, with an ad-
equately efficient and competitive financial market, a financial institu-
tion holding large portfolios of government paper can be regarded as
liquid, as these securities can be converted into claims on the central
bank at any time. This statement is not valid at the level of the entire
banking system, given that, all other factors remaining unchanged, the
sale and purchase of a government security within the banking system
does not change the total amount of claims on the central bank.
(Claims of the banking system on the central bank will only change if
the other party to the transaction is the Bank or the Treasury.) All this is
true if reversed – if a series of government securities matures, then it will
certainly induce an increase in interbank liquidity. This fact is inde-
pendent of whether the given bond is held by a commercial bank, an in-
vestment fund or the public. In case, for example, a government paper
held by an investment fund matures, then the Treasury transfers the
equivalent of the bond to the account of the given fund, which will in-
crease the account holding bank’s claims on the central bank.




Over the short term, i.e. within one maintenance period, the ef-
fect of items influencing the position of banks vis-à-vis the central
bank will be reflected in the settlement account. However, because
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19 Under the provisions of the Central Bank Act, the NBH manages the account of the ÁPV Rt as
well.TheliquidityeffectofpaymentseffectedfromtheaccountareequaltothatofKESZ,therefore,
for the sake of simplicity, the Paper does not discuss the account of ÁPV Rt.the balance on the settlement account is determined by the reserve
requirement on average over a month, the forecast of developments
in the settlement account balance will not be determined by factors
affecting liquidity, but by the expected developments in banks’ lia-
bilities. In other words, the effect of factors influencing liquidity over
one maintenance period will feed through to the fluctuations in the
settlement account balance and, within the individual reserve main-
tenance periods, into the outstanding stock of sterilisation instru-
ments (see Chart 3).
2.3 Forecasting liquidity






The rolling liquidity programme, by giving a forecast of the develop-
ments in the central bank’s balance sheet and income statement
items, defines the expected developments in the outstanding sterili-
sation instruments over a 7–18 month horizon. The theoretical basis
for defining the programme is provided by the fact that, at bottom,
the factors affecting interbank liquidity influence the outstanding
amount of sterilisation instruments.

































Factors affecting banks’ claims on the NBH
20 The items noted here may, in principle, affect interbank liquidity in both directions (fore exam-
ple,interventionintheforeignexchangemarketatthestrongedgeofthebandreducesliquidityand
increases at the weak edge). In the list, we have expressed the individual items in a form in which
theyboostliquidity(forexample,thedecreaseinnotesandcoinincirculation);iftheireffectisactu-
ally the opposite, then, consistently, the negative sign is used.Factors affecting the size of banks’ claims on the NBH:
+ foreign exchange market intervention
+ expansionary effect on liquidity of changes in KESZ
+ decrease in banknotes and coin in circulation
+ net interest payments to banks
+ increase in outstanding refinancing credit
Rearrangements in banks’ position vis-à-vis the NBH:
+ decrease in settlement account balance
+ effect of changes in net outstanding overnight deposits, repo
and swaps on liquidity
Changes in outstanding sterilisation instruments
Outstanding sterilisa-
tion instruments can
be forecast on the av-
erage of one month
As reserve requirements apply on average over a month, the
outstanding amount of sterilisation instruments, too, can be forecast
only as the average of one month. Accordingly, the effects of the fac-
tors on liquidity need to be forecast on a monthly average basis. This
means that, in the case of ‘events’ affecting sterilisation instruments,
not only their size but their timing within the maintenance period as
well should be taken into account.
Let us assume that the NBH is conducting foreign exchange market intervention
in the amount of HUF 9 billion, with a value date of 10 September. This will affect
the September maintenance period only for 20 days, so the expansionary effect
of the intervention on liquidity in September will be 9*20/30=6 (HUF billions).
As the average liquidity of the October maintenance period will be affected in full
by the intervention conducted in September, the expansionary effect on liquidity
in October will be HUF 9 billion. The difference between the two values, HUF 3
billion, will be the pass-through liquidity effect of the intervention.
The rolling liquidity programme rounds up the forecasts of sev-
eral items of the national bank’s balance sheet. These forecasts are
built on the monetary programme of the NBH;
21 however, they are
updated more frequently and are more detailed.
Interventions in the
foreign exchange
market are the most
uncertain item to fore-
cast
The forecast of the size of expected intervention in the foreign
exchange market relies in part on the projections of the balance of
payments and in part on the aggregate balance sheet of the banking
sector. By its nature, this is the most uncertain item over the short
term; intervention is generally conducted in waves, which are diffi-
cult to predict, rather than on an even basis. This is the reason why
the rolling liquidity programme is prepared in two versions. One ver-
sion is based on the assumption of monthly intervention expected on
the basis of the monetary programme. The other version, in contrast,
does not take into account further interventions. The basis for fore-
casting the monetary base is the forecast of developments in the
banking sector’s liabilities.
Transactions between
the NBH and the
Treasury do not affect
interbank liquidity
Probably the most important requirement of the rolling liquidity
programme is to quantify the effect of central government sector on li-
quidity. To this end, a forecast of KESZ needs to be made which elimi-
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21 For a detailed description of the monetary programme, see Barabás and Major (2001).nates transactions from the change in KESZ which the Treasury per-
forms with the NBH and therefore do not affect interbank liquidity. In or-
der to forecast the daily development in KESZ, primary revenue and
expenditure, and items related to financing need to be estimated. Al-
though they follow a typical course, developments in the state budget
balance
22 cannot be directly estimated with the precision required,
therefore, separate estimates of the major items of the central budget,
e.g. VAT and PIT revenue, expenditure by the central government units
etc., need to be made. The most important background information for
the estimate is the developments in earlier years, which are comple-
mented with data reported by the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury.
Based on the actual data, the forecast of the general government ac-
count is updated daily, using an error correction mechanism.
Developments in cur-
rency in circulation
are forecast by an er-
ror correction model
Forecasts of changes in banknotes and coin in circulation are
based on an error correction model developed by the Bank to project
changes in the monthly averages of currency in circulation. Velocity
growth is defined as the difference between the real growth rates of
GDP and cash. According to the model, there exists a long-term
equilibrium relationship between velocity growth and inflation, and
the velocity of money fluctuates around the trend defined by the
equilibrium relationship.
Monthly average cash balance targets are derived from the er-
ror correction mechanism. Starting out from these forecasts, devel-
opments in the cash balance holdings within a month can be pro-
jected based on relatively stable outturns, characteristic of the indi-
vidual months of the year. In order to be adequately precise, there is
the need of using all information available, therefore, the forecasts of
daily developments are constantly adjusted taking into account daily
data for cash balances.
In addition to forecasting the likely medium-term, i.e. the 7 to
18-month, course of developments in the sterilisation instruments,
the rolling liquidity programme is also a useful tool for central bank li-
quidity planning over the short-term, i.e. over the 1 to 2-month
horizon. In case the central bank does not exclusively use standing fa-
cilities, it is important to have an adequate picture of the expected
stock of sterilisation instruments and the expected demand at auc-
tions when announcing the various quantities or accepting the bids.
2.3.2 Intra maintenance periods: the daily liquidity
programme
The structure of the daily liquidity programme is identical to that of
the rolling liquidity forecast, with the difference that it provides a
forecast of the daily developments in commercial banks’ settlement
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22 For the purposes of this Paper, general government comprises only the central government,
the social security funds and the extra-budgetary funds (the local government authorities are not in
a direct financing relationship with the NBH).account balances and the outstanding stocks of sterilisation instru-
ments, rather than the average outstanding stock of sterilisation in-
struments.
The daily liquidity programme helps establish the banking sec-
tor’s actual and expected compliance with the reserve requirement.
The overnight interbank rate, in turn, can be forecast with the help of





It is of fundamental importance when using quantitative mone-
tary policy instruments that the central bank should know, even on a
daily basis, the banking sector’s actual and expected liquidity posi-
tion. The reserve requirement is currently 7 per cent. Although it pro-
vides the banking sector with adequate buffer to handle liquidity
shocks, it is useful to announce the quantitative instruments in ac-
cordance with the actual liquidity position of the banking sector.
Therefore, it is important for the central bank to cushion the effects of
liquidity shocks on the sector’s reserve accounts (KESZ, cash),
which, in turn, facilitates the monetary transmission mechanism via
the reduction in interest rate volatility.
A third possible area of using the daily liquidity forecast is fine
tuning liquidity and using quick tenders. Interbank rates may depart
for protracted periods from the major policy rate. If the central bank
believes this to be disturbing the monetary transmission mechanism,
then it may alleviate the evolving liquidity strains by using quick
tenders on the liabilities side. The daily liquidity programme provides
the basis for quantities announced on the quick tender as well.
2.4 Monetary policy instruments of the NBH
2.4.1 Changes to the instruments
Direction of changes
to instruments
The monetary policy instruments of the NBH have seen several
changes since March 1995, when the crawling-peg exchange rate
regime was introduced. The Bank has adopted new tools, while
abandoning a number of others it used earlier. In the past five years,
the maturity of the major policy instrument has been shortened, so
the Bank allows an increasing room for market forces to shape the
yield curve. Another important change from the perspective of li-
quidity management has been the reduction in the averaging period
to one month and, later, the broader use of discretionary tools, par-
ticularly active liquidity management. In the following, the Paper will
present the major stages in the development of central bank liquid-
ity management by highlighting the landmarks of the reform of in-
struments.
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on a standing basis
The period up to March 2000 basically featured passive, accommo-
dating liquidity management. The Bank’s policy instruments were
operated on a standing basis, except for the quick tender, intro-
duced in January 1999, which played a complementary role. The
Bank accepted deposits and provided finance on demand by com-
mercial banks at the given interest rate level. The Bank did not di-
rectly influence the quantity of reserves – autonomous factors and
the banking sector together determined developments in the quan-
tities of liquidity. The role of the major policy instrument was played
by the two-week deposit in the period starting from March 1999.
Commercial banks had recourse to the instrument twice a week, on
a periodical basis. The two-week deposit served as the major policy
instrument, a sterilisation instrument as well as a tool to manage li-
quidity within maintenance periods.
2.4.1.2 Shift towards active (discretionary) liquidity
management
From the 1998 Russian financial crisis up to the third quarter
of 1999, the Bank’s interest rate policy did not run into any hurdles
caused by the exchange rate regime. This was owing to the fact that
the demand for foreign investments fell in the second half of 1998
due to concerns over the situation in the international capital mar-
kets, and then once again, in the first half of 1999, due to worries
linked with the imbalances besetting the Hungarian economy.
As a consequence, the inflow of foreign capital remained insignifi-
cant at the level of interest rates maintained by the Bank in order
to assist the disinflation process. However, from October 1999
international developments encouraged foreign investors to take
higher risks and, owing to the reduction in Hungary’s current
account deficit, the credibility of the exchange rate mechanism in-
creased. These resulted in the demand for forint investments pick-
ing up. Intensifying capital inflows triggered more and more mas-
sive official interventions, and the amount outstanding of sterilisa-
tion instruments rose significantly. The Bank was forced to lower
interest rates, in order to curb speculative, short-term capital in-
flows and reduce the costs of sterilisation. During the period of mas-
sive official interventions in the foreign exchange market, the policy
rate departed from three-month government securities yields, i.e.
it shifted out of focus, with disturbance coming into play in the
transmission mechanism.
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yields departed from
the major policy rate
The recovery of confidence in forint investments had only a
muted influence on the domestic interest rate level in the period prior
to 1999. The increase in demand for forint investments was reflected
in intensifying intervention or the shifts in the exchange rate,
prompting the Bank to take an interest rate decision in response.
But, in contrast with earlier years, there was no need of central bank
intervention to achieve a reduction in the domestic interest rate level
in the period between late 1999 and early 2000, and domestic rates




Partial explanation for this process was that in the period market
participants, other than banks, had access only to short-dated assets
bearing much lower returns than that remunerated on the central bank
deposit. There were basically two reasons for this. One was that only
banks had direct access to the single sterilisation instrument, i.e. the
two-week central bank deposit. The other was that purchases of gov-
ernment securities by non-residents caused the amount outstanding
of short-dated government paper, accessible to non-bank partici-
pants, to fall dramatically. Non-bank participants of the market,
therefore, attempted to make short-term investments via the banking
system. ‘Mock’ repo is the popular name of the product designed to
circumvent paying the costs of compliance with reserve require-
ments. Due to more stringent control, banks offered less and less of
mock repo to their clients. Consequently, non-bank participants were
only able to invest their surplus liquidity into bank deposits subject to
reserve requirements, the interest rate on which was some 80 basis
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Interest rate differential (right-hand scale)
Size of interest rate reduction
Three-month effective benchmark yield (left-hand scale)
Effective rate on two-week deposit (left-hand scale)
Introduction of the NBH
three-month bill
Chart 4
Gap between three-month benchmark yields and the major policy rate:
August 1999–July 2000*
*Effective yield is derived by compounding yields.points lower, i.e. equal to the costs of reserve requirements, than the
central bank policy rate.
23 Foreign investors’ demand for government
securities picked up. This led to commercial banks running out of
their short-dated paper, so they could no longer influence the yields in
the government securities market and nor did they offer their clients
repo products relying on their long-dated government paper holdings.
By doing so, they shut market participants off from yield opportunities
offered by central bank instruments. As a result, non-bank partici-
pants of the money market were barred even from indirect access to
sterilisation instruments, so yield levels in the two partial markets be-
came independent of each other.
Meanwhile, commercial banks converted their foreign ex-
change assets into sterilisation instruments by selling foreign curren-
cies spot and buying foreign currencies forward.
24 So, by opening
on-balance sheet positions, they were able to exploit the differential
between the policy rate and government securities yields, while leav-
ing a substantial part of their forint exchange rate risk unhedged.
Consequently, despite the fall in government securities yields, the
intervention pressure did not abate, and the effect of forint demand
arising from commercial banks’ derivatives positions accounted for
a growing portion of intervention.
The Bank responded to the problem by changing its monetary
policy tools. It recognised the need to introduce an instrument which
was accessible for non-bank participants as well and was tradable, and
it could help narrow the gap between short-dated government securi-
ties yields and the interest rate on the two-week deposit, while it had a
longer maturity than the major policy instrument, therefore it was capa-
ble of increasing the maturity of outstanding sterilisation instruments
and, consequently, its stability as well. The Bank has opted for a
three-month negotiable bill. The bill is sold once a week at variable-rate
tenders, i.e. the Bank, based on the bids received, may choose to de-





With the introduction of the instrument, tension between the
policy function and the sterilisation function of the two-week deposit
lessened, and market equilibrium was restored (see Chart 4). More
than 50 per cent of outstanding sterilisation instruments were
switched into NBH bills in two months following the introduction of
the instrument. Simultaneously with this, given that the NBH bill pro-
vided room for non-bank domestic investors as well to directly pur-
chase a money market instrument issued by the Bank, participants
other than commercial banks took possession of nearly a half of out-
standing central bank sterilisation instruments.
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23Explanationforthemorethan80basispointdifferencebetweenthetwo-weekdepositrateand
the three-month government securities yield is market participants’ expectations of a rate cut.
24 The other party to a forward contract was generally the subsidiary or a commercial bank, e.g.
its securities broker. In these cases, banks reduced their overall open positions to zero, although
they did not hedge the exchange rate risk, as the broker took a long forint position.Parallel with the introduction of the three-month instrument, the
Bank switched from offering the two-week deposit twice a week into
the once-a-week operation of the instrument. The aim with this step




bill, the active nature
of liquidity manage-
ment strengthened
The three-month bill is basically a discretionary tool. It helped
strengthen the active nature of liquidity management. Although the
outstanding amount of sterilisation instruments continued to be de-
termined by the demand for them (taking into account the fact that
the two-week deposit was still operated on a standing basis), the
Bank had an influence on how much of liquidity to be sterilised
flowed into sterilisation instruments. Thus, forecasting develop-
ments in liquidity was given a greater role.
2.5 Factors explaining developments in
interbank rates – the liquidity indicator
One of the goals of li-
quidity management
is to reduce fluctua-
tions in overnight
rates
One of the core objectives with the design of the operating frame-
work and liquidity management is to reduce fluctuations in over-
night rates, stemming from the variability of liquidity conditions – if
fluctuations in interbank rates spill over along the yield curve, then
this may set rates serving as the operating target in motion as well.
This may cause two problems. First, monetary policy may lose
some of its transparency, as changes in the operating interest rate
level are influenced by liquidity conditions of the moment. Second,
the danger increases that the market misinterprets the reasons for
changes in yields and therefore it draws false conclusions in respect
of the objectives of monetary policy.
The interest rate corri-
dor limits movements
in overnight rates
The Bank uses several instruments to check volatility in over-
night rates. The interest rate corridor bounds fluctuations in over-
night rates around the major policy rate level. Another tool for
checking interest rate volatility is reserve averaging.
The instruments mentioned earlier are passive from the per-
spective of reducing interest rate volatility. But there is a need of a
discretionary tool, even in the case of passive liquidity management,
which is capable of keeping in check fluctuations in interbank inter-
est rate which stem from an unexpected change in liquidity condi-
tions. The preconditions for an efficient reduction in interest rate vol-
atility via active liquidity management or using a discretionary tool
are the precise forecast of changes in liquidity conditions and under-
standing the behaviour of overnight rates. The explanation for this is
that only in this way will the central bank be able to estimate the
amount of additional liquidity to be injected into or withdrawn from
the system, in order for the overnight rate level to return to the
mid-range of the interest rate corridor.
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interbank rate volatil-
ity reflects only unan-
ticipated influences
The demand for reserves is known in advance over the entire
maintenance period, i.e. a calendar month. If the market of reserves
functioned perfectly and banks acted in a risk-neutral way, then as-
suring liquidity through meeting demand for reserves would stabilise
the overnight rate. In this way, banks would react by large amount
interbank borrowing or lending to a departure of the overnight on a
given day from the interest rate level anticipated for the following
day based on the set of information available on the same day. Un-
der such circumstances, given the above assumptions, fluctuations
in the interbank rate levels would only reflect the effects of unantici-
pated changes in liquidity. If the central bank neutralised success-
fully the changes in liquidity unanticipated by banks, then the inter-
est rate level would remain constant.
Due to credit ceil-
ings…
The above conditions, however, cannot be met for a number of
reasons. First, the interbank market is far from being perfect. Banks
set credit ceilings vis-à-vis each other, i.e. they do not lend each
other indefinitely. So it may happen that, on the aggregate level, the
demand for reserves is equal to supply, but individual banks are fac-
ing liquidity deficits while others are accumulating liquidity sur-
pluses. Another factor which may inhibit expectations of future inter-
est rates from perfectly being priced in rates for a given day is that re-
serve balances on commercial banks’ settlement accounts may not
dip into the negative. This latter hurdle is usually ineffective in Hun-
gary due to the 7 per cent reserve ratio.
…and banks’ risk
averse behaviour…
Second, banks are not risk neutral. They try to avoid using
overnight repo to meet the reserve requirements for prudential and
other reasons which involve internal regulations. In addition, the
central bank ceiling used for repo may also contribute to the situa-
tion where banks try to reduce the probability to zero of having to ob-
tain additional liquidity at above market rates due to an unexpected
liquidity shock.
25 Risk aversion also depends on how efficiently
banks are able to manage their own liquidity. The greater the uncer-
tainties, the higher the excess holdings linked with prudential con-
siderations. As the end of the maintenance period is coming closer,
the need to meet the reserve requirement on the days remaining is
increasingly constraining the room for liquidity management, as the
number of days left, i.e. the time available for offsetting any ex-
cess/deficiency, reduces.
…demand for re-
serves in only moder-
ately interest elastic
From the reasons discussed above it follows that the demand
for reserves in Hungary is only moderately interest elastic and,
moreover, interest elasticity diminishes as the time remaining form
the maintenance period reduces. A fact providing evidence for the
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 35
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS AT THE NBH
25 Commercial banks’ cautious behaviour within the maintenance period suggests that their cost
perception is asymmetrical. Banks judge it to be a greater problem to obtain the necessary liquidity
in repo at the end of the maintenance period than to dispose of their excess liquidity by placing it
intoovernightdeposits,althoughinonecasetheyhavetoborrowatarate2percenthigherthanthe
policy rate and lend at a rate 2 per cent below the policy rate.low interest elasticity of demand for reserves is that movements in
overnight rates within the maintenance period follow a more or less
stable pattern, and that interbank rates usually fall to the bottom of
the interest rate corridor towards the final few days of maintenance
periods. (see Chart 5).
When interest elastic-
ity is low, the buffer
function of the aver-
aging mechanism is
weaker
To the extent that the interest elasticity of demand for reserves is
lower, the reactions of the overnight rate level to the banking systems’
reserve position will be more sensitive. Consequently, the role of re-
serve averaging as a buffer will decline, as banks are less willing to
manage their daily liquidity positions subject to the expected interest
rate path if demand for reserves is less interest sensitive. Therefore,
we are faced with two options if we want to understand the behaviour
of overnight rates. Either we have to seek explanatory variables or in-
dicators which characterise well the daily liquidity position of the
banking system, or to build a model which takes into account that the
link between liquidity conditions and overnight rates will change as
the end of the maintenance period is coming closer.
In the following, we will define indicators which, meeting differ-
ent criteria, are suitable for evaluating the liquidity position of the
banking system for a given day. Then we will examine which are
those indicators that, having passed our tests, describe well the be-
haviour of overnight rates and are suitable for forecasting it. Table C
provides a brief summary of the indicators. (The following chapters
contain descriptions of the notations and expressions used in the
Table.)
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The overnight interest rate corridor and movements in overnight rates
between September 1998–December 20002.5.1 Indicators of compliance with the reserve
requirements
The excess reserve in-
dicator compares
daily reserve level
with the reserve re-
quirement
One of the important indicators of liquidity conditions for a given
day measures excess or deficient reserve position, which can be cal-




where R is the reserve requirement,
Rt is the daily compliance and
t is the number of days passed in the maintenance period.
However, because participants have to satisfy the reserve re-
quirement on average over a calendar month, this indicator does not
take into account (i) reserves accumulated on the days passed in the
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 37
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS AT THE NBH
Table C
Indicators of banking sector reserve surpluses
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and ex antemaintenance period and (ii) the liquidity effects expected during the
remainder of the maintenance period (see Chart 6).
The indicator which shows cumulative excess or deficient hold-
ings during time elapsed in the maintenance period satisfies criterion
(i). It can be calculated as the difference between the averages of

















We have observed empirically the values of the indicator of cu-
mulative excess reserve holdings. We have found that the banking
sector generally complies with the reserve requirement ‘from the
top’, i.e. banks tend to hold cumulative excess reserves during the
month and that cumulative excess holdings shrink in the majority of
cases (see Chart 7). By accumulating excess reserve holdings at the
start of the month, banks try to secure a significant portion of re-
serves in advance and to protect themselves from potential negative
liquidity shocks that may arise towards the end of the month.
The requirements banks need to satisfy during the mainte-
nance period can be established on the basis of their past compli-
ance with the reserve requirement. The balance of reserve require-
ments equals the daily average requirement to accumulate reserves
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Differences between the overnight rate and the two-week
deposit rate (left-hand scale)
Overcompliance on a given day (right-hand, reverse scale)
Chart 6
Overcompliance on a given day and the overnight rate in 2000 Q2
* The overnight rate is shown as the gap between it and the two-week deposit rate.from the given day until the end of the maintenance period. When
calculating the indicator, account of the actual compliance until the
day of observation is taken, and the amount to be accumulated dur-















where n is the length of maintenance period in days.
The balance of reserve requirements shows how much reserves
banks will need to place on their settlement accounts on a daily aver-
age starting from day t+1 until month-end, in order for their monthly
compliance to meet the reserve requirement.
Comparing banks’ compliance with the reserve requirement on
a given day relative to the remaining requirement, we obtain an indi-
cator which takes into account both actual compliance with the re-
quirement during the period passed up to now and the remaining
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Cumulative excess holdings and the overnight rate in 2000 Q2If the value of effec-
tive reserve surpluses
is positive, then




This gauge of compliance with reserve requirements we call ef-
fective reserve surpluses. If the value of effective reserve surpluses is
positive, then banks will be able to meet the reserve requirement
during the remainder of the maintenance period even by reducing
their reserve holdings. If, however, the value of reserve surpluses is
negative, banks will need to step up compliance with the require-
ment in order to satisfy the monthly average requirement (see
Chart 8).
Let the amount of reserve requirements be HUF 400 billion and the length of
maintenance period 30 days. If the average of compliance is HUF 410 billion in
the first 20 days, and the total amount of actual daily reserve holdings is HUF
415 billion, then the amount of excess holdings on a given day is HUF 15 bil-
lion, which exceeds the HUF 10 billion of cumulative reserve holdings by HUF 5
billion. Due to the cumulative excess reserve holdings, banks will need to hold
only HUF 380 billion on average on the accounts during the remaining 10 days
in order to meet the reserve requirement. The amount of the banking sector’s
reserve surpluses therefore is HUF 415 billion – HUF 380 billion = HUF 35 bil-
lion.
2.5.2 Effective reserve surpluses
and the liquidity indicator
The indicators of compliance with reserve requirements presented
so far do not take into account liquidity shocks expected to occur
during the remainder of the month and those that will certainly oc-
cur. A different interbank rate level pertains to the actual level of re-
serve surpluses if banks expect their settlement account balances to
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Difference between the overnight rate and the two-week
deposit rate (left-hand scale))
Effective reserve surpluses (right-hand scale)
HUF billions
Chart 8
Effective reserve surpluses and developments in the overnight rate
in 2000 Q2rise during the remainder of the maintenance period (liquidity ex-
pansion) and yet another one if liquidity is expected to fall.
Part of the factors af-
fecting liquidity can
be forecast with full
certainty
The items affecting liquidity known with great confidence in-
clude the maturing amounts outstanding in sterilisation instruments.
In the case of three-month NBH bills, the maturing stock of outstand-
ing instruments is known for the entire maintenance period in ad-
vance, while the two-week deposit is known two weeks in advance,
and overnight deposits, repo and swaps are known one day in ad-
vance. The maturing instruments tend to increase interbank liquidity
and, provided that no allotment of the instruments is made, then the
amount of maturing instruments will boost banks’ reserve compli-
ance. The larger part of maturing instruments generally is rolled
over, but this is not taken into account when calculating effective re-
serve surpluses and the liquidity indicator, as our purpose is just to
define the amount which banks are able to invest in sterilisation in-
struments while satisfying the reserve requirement.
The autonomous fac-
tors can be forecast
with varying cer-
tainty
The autonomous sources of interbank liquidity are the ex-
pected changes in the KESZ balance and in cash in circulation. No
absolutely reliable information is available about these two factors;
their expansionary effect on liquidity, however, can be estimated
with relative certainty. Therefore, this forecast is taken into account
when calculating expected reserve accumulation. Intervention in the
foreign exchange market is known two days in advance under the
t+2 accounting convention. It can be another autonomous source of
interbank liquidity. The forecasts of intervention are very uncertain,





() denote the change in liquidity for day t+i at a t point of
time. Then, compliance with reserves for day t+i can be expressed
with the equation below:
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The size of expected average compliance with reserve require-
ments during the remainder of the month can be defined on the basis
















When calculating the expected remaining average compliance
with reserve requirements, we assume that banks do not place
two-week and overnight deposits with the central bank during the
days remaining in the maintenance period, nor are NBH bills issued.
Our purpose with this method is to define the level of banks’ effective
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balances expected during the remaining period on the basis of infor-
mation about the shocks known or predictable with great confidence
during the remainder of the month.
Effective surplus
reserves
The banking sector’s effective reserve surpluses can be defined
as the difference between the average of reserve compliance ex-
pected during the remaining period and the average of compliance




h () 4 
Let us assume that the banking sector permanently withdraws
an amount from the settlement accounts on day t+1, and places it
into assets maturing beyond the end of the maintenance period.
Then, this indicator shows that the amount outstanding in maturing
sterilisation instruments will be just enough to satisfy the reserve re-
quirement without the need to have recourse to repo or overnight de-
posit.
This will not be equal to the amount which the banking system
would withdraw on day t+1 or on day t+2 and so forth. Consequently, the
above indicator assumes a one-off, permanent withdrawal of liquidity.
In addition to the level of the effective reserve surplus, the time
schedule of investing liquidity surpluses influences the amounts that
can be invested. In the following, let us denote the amount of invest-
ments reducing reserve compliance on individual days with xt+i.
Here, we assume investments whose maturities fall within a later
maintenance period (for example, the purchase of an NBH bill).
Then, actual compliance on the first day will differ from Rt+1 forecast
earlier by precisely xt+1. With the withdrawal of amount xt+2 on the fol-
lowing day, compliance will differ from Rt+2 by xt+1+xt+2, and so forth.
Series x must be such that reserve compliance should still hold on








































If all possible free liquidity is withdrawn from the banking sys-
tem on the first day, then, choosing xt+2=...=xn=0, we obtain the
amount of this by substituting into the equation above: xt+1=st
(4)
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26 In the case of banking holidays, the value of the xt+j variable is always zero, as banks cannot
place deposits.We can see that, according to what have been said, the level of
effective reserve surpluses shows exactly the amount that the bank-
ing sector may withdraw in one amount on day t+1, so that it will
likely be able to meet the reserve requirement without the need to
have recourse to overnight repo.
If the banking system delays it until the last day to withdraw and
invest its reserve surpluses, then the amount of reserves that can be
withdrawn will be substantially higher: substituting into the formula
above and assuming xt+1=...xn–1 =0 :x n = (n–t)st
(4).
This means that, if reserve surpluses of the banking sector are, for example,
HUF 15 billion on the 20
th day of the maintenance period and the length of the
maintenance period is 30 days, then investing the amount on a given day, for
example placing it into two-week deposit, will be the same as parking the same
amount on the reserve account, and investing HUF 150 billion only on the last
day in overnight deposit.
So, with a given level of effective reserve surpluses, the size
of liquidity that can be withdrawn strongly depends on the timing of
those surpluses. The liquidity indicator differs from the effective re-
serve surplus in that we have assumed a different path of timing the
investment of liquidity. In the case of the liquidity indicator, equal
amounts are withdrawn from the accounts on each business day.
The liquidity indica-
tor
The liquidity indicator shows the amount that the banking sec-
tor may withdraw from the accounts on each business day remain-
ing in the maintenance period, without expected compliance falling
below the reserve requirement.
The gauge can be calculated by sub-
stituting into the above formula, using the condition xt+1=…=x n= x.
After substituting into the formula, the following expression will de-
fine the actual value of the liquidity indicator, based on information


















The value of the liquidity indicator is always positive due to
the structural liquidity surplus of the banking sector. Given the
current instruments of monetary policy, commercial banks may
place deposits with the central bank or purchase NBH bills once
a week, with a Wednesday value date. The value of the liquidity indi-
cator constantly rises between two subsequent investments, as,
provided that banks do not place overnight deposits or liquidity does
not ebb away dramatically, banks’ account balances will not be
lower by the daily average amount which the liquidity indicator sug-
gests. On the Wednesday value date, in contrast, banks place con-
siderably more deposits than suggested by the liquidity indicator,
therefore the value of the indicator generally falls. Due to the above
distinct features, the indicator takes a saw-teeth like pattern (see
Chart 9).
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for the liquidity indicator and the position of the overnight interest
rate within the corridor. The most important similarity is the extreme
value of the indicator evolving towards the end of the month linked
with the accumulation of excess holdings, which generally coincides
with the interest rate falling as low as the bottom of the interest rate
corridor.
2.5.3 Forecasting the overnight rate
On days close to the
end of the mainte-




Generally, banks’ demand for reserves is only moderately and pro-
gressively less interest elastic, as time remaining in the mainte-
nance period reduces. Therefore, the indicators characterising the
daily liquidity conditions of the system are believed to be closely re-
lated to developments in the overnight rate. The explanation for this
is that commercial banks do not react by robust borrowing or in-
vesting to the departure of the overnight interbank rate from the
two-week deposit rate constituting the mid-band of the interest rate
corridor. Owing to this, now and then the overnight rate departs sig-
nificantly from the mid-band of the interest rate corridor even prior
to the final days of the maintenance period.
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deposit rate (left-hand scale)
Difference between the overnight rate and the two-week
Liquidity indicator (right-hand scale)
HUF billions
Chart 9
The liquidity indicator and developments in the overnight rate in 2000 Q2Volatility in the over-
night rate is ex-
plained partly by the
liquidity indicator
and partly by the ac-
tual level of reserve
surpluses
The results show that the liquidity indicator offers only a partial
explanation for the volatility in the overnight rate. There may be
several reasons for this. First, if the demand for reserves is to some
extent interest elastic, mostly at the beginning of the maintenance
period, then we do not expect the indicator and the interest rate level
to be in a close relationship. In such circumstances, the overabun-
dance of liquidity does not cause a fall in overnight rates, because
banks are almost fully confident that they will be able to unload their
excess liquidity by placing two-week deposits or purchasing NBH
bills during the remainder of the maintenance period, and that
they will not need to place it in overnight deposits bearing lower
rates.
Second, there is not always an equilibrium of supply and de-
mand in the market, as there are impediments, institutional (credit
limits, the imperfections of the flow of information, not fully competi-
tive market) and behavioural, to the efficient allocation of liquidity.
In this case, the indicator capturing the degree of excess or deficient
holdings of reserves cannot reflect the overnight interest rate level
evolving in a segmented market.
Third, the scope of information used to calculate the liquidity
indicator is wider than of that available for market participants.
Within the factors affecting liquidity, the effect of changes in the
KESZ balance can be estimated with a lower degree of uncertainty
for the entire banking system than for a single bank (information
asymmetry). Therefore, commercial banks’ liquidity management
practices are probably less forward looking than the liquidity indica-
tor ‘suggests’. Consequently, commercial banks’ decisions are at
times related to the effective reserve surpluses (which are derived as
the difference between compliance with reserve requirements on a
given day and the average compliance during the remainder of the
maintenance period). Therefore, when explaining the behaviour of
overnight rates, we should take into account this indicator as well,
given that it tends to affect strongly demand in the interbank market.
The liquidity indicator and the actual level of effective reserve
surpluses combined account for 42% of volatility in the overnight
rates within the month. (The detailed statistics of the regression can
be found in the Appendix.)
Based on the regression correlation, we can make a forecast of
the expected movements in overnight rates in a way that we need to
provide estimates of the variables influencing the future reserve po-
sition of the banking sector. This requires estimating investments in
sterilisation instruments as well. To this end, information obtained up
till now about the behaviour of the banking system is taken into ac-
count. This means that overnight rates are forecast on the basis of li-
quidity conditions as a combination of econometric and expert esti-
mates. Based on credit institutions’ cautious practice of accumulat-
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mand for sterilisation instruments. Thus, we obtain the values of re-
serve surpluses and the liquidity indicator, which helps us forecast
the overnight rate (see Chart 10).
2.6 Chapters from the history of liquidity
management by the NBH
2.6.1 Introduction of the two-week deposit
Augusts 1998:
increasing the main-
tenance period to one
month
When reforming its monetary policy instruments in August 1998,
the Bank lengthened the maintenance period related to compulsory
reserves from two weeks to one month.
27 The longer averaging
period has greatly helped banks manage their liquidity, as the
period to react to liquidity shocks has become longer. The balance
on central budget account is the most responsible factor for fluctua-
46 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY














































































Actual overnight rates and estimated values from regression
in 2000 Q2
27 Prior to September 1998, there were two maintenance periods in one calendar month, the first
lasting from the beginning of the month until the 15
th, the other lasting from the 16
th until
month-end.tions in the settlement account balance. The other advantage of the
one-month averaging system over the two-week averaging system
is that the budget account balance also follows a characteristic







Simultaneously with lengthening the maintenance period, the
Bank ceased to operate the one-week deposit, and it switched the
one-month deposit from a standing into a periodically available fa-
cility. Basically, the one-week deposit was a tool to assist liquidity
management, at the same time as being the Bank’s major dealing in-
strument. Although the rate on the facility was 50 basis points less
than that remunerated on the one-month deposit, it was 300–500
basis points higher than the interest rate on the overnight deposit.
Banks mostly used the instrument to offset liquidity fluctuations
within the month caused by monthly cycles in KESZ. Lengthening
the maintenance period to one month and narrowing the overnight
interest rate corridor did no longer justify the keeping of this tool in
operation.
The Russian crisis: in-
tervention at the floor
of the exchange rate
band
The reform of the monetary policy instruments, announced
earlier, coincided with the unfolding of a financial crisis in Russia.
Although the Bank had not conducted foreign exchange interven-
tions at the ceiling of the exchange rate band since May, the out-
standing amount of sterilisation instruments exceeded HUF 940
billion in August 1998. At the end of August 1998, the forint ex-
change rate reached the floor of the intervention band, and the
Bank was forced to conduct continued interventions. The new in-
struments now being phased in, the swift drop in interbank liquid-
ity created entirely new conditions for commercial banks’ treasury
systems. Interventions in the foreign exchange market were con-
ducted in waves, so the maturity profile of the one-month depos-
its, placed evenly earlier, became extremely uneven. The maturity
of the one-month deposit was 28 days. As this coincided almost
perfectly with the length of the maintenance period, most of de-




spilled over to longer
maturities
Compounding the problems, speculation on an imminent re-
duction in official interest rates began to unfold as the crisis abated,
and banks tried to pace their deposits accordingly. All this fed
through to hectic movements in surplus liquidity and an increased
volatility of the overnight rate. Quick pulsations of liquidity condi-
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28 Taking into account that the tax payments, implying great uncertainty, fall at the end of the
month, the NBH proposed that the maintenance period should coincide with a calendar month, but
should start on the 16t




part of the periodtions and extreme developments in overnight rates spread over to
longer maturities, which caused a noise in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.
In March 1999, the Bank, adapting to the changed circum-
stances, shortened the maturity of its deposit from one month to
two weeks. This step made it easier for banks to manage their li-
quidity in several ways. First, the maturity of the deposit was now
shorter than the length of the maintenance period, which meant
that deposits placed at the beginning of the month were released
right at the end of the maintenance period. Second, assuming equal
amounts of outstanding deposits, the average maturing deposit
stock was twice as much, which increased the room for liquidity
management, due to the maturity having been cut to a half. Owing
to the shorter maturity, banks were less motivated to speculate on




Although external conditions meanwhile also settled, interbank
rates stabilised significantly following the introduction of the two-
week deposit. All this found reflection in surplus liquidity and devel-
opments in overnight rates.
2.6.2 The quick tender of January 1999
The quick tender is
the most flexible in-
strument of the cen-
tral bank
The Bank enlarged its monetary policy instruments with the intro-
duction of the quick tender in January 1999. The quick tender is a
flexible tool, the Bank having a great freedom in using it. The facility
is announced with same-day settlement date in the morning. Quick
tenders can be conducted in various forms, from volume through in-
terest rate to mixed tenders, but they can take the form of deposit or
repo tenders as well, their maturity being determined by the central
bank arbitrarily. In contrast with most monetary policy tools, quick
tenders do not have pre-specified scheduling – they are used in li-
quidity situations as warranted by externalities.
The Bank altered its monetary policy instruments in September
1998. The maintenance period was lengthened from two weeks to
one month, the one-week deposit was abolished and central bank
assistance on a standing basis was replaced by periodical availabil-
ity. This meant that banks had the opportunity to place deposits with
the authorities twice a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays, with a T+1
settlement. The maturity of the Bank’s deposit for policy purposes
was 28 days.
The Bank conducted heavy interventions at the exchange rate
band’s floor during the Russian financial crisis. As an effect, com-
mercial banks’ deposits with the Bank began to shrink rapidly, their
average amount being only HUF 125 billion in December 1998 com-
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amount of deposits, the value of maturing deposits also fell signifi-
cantly, and so the banking system’s ability to adjust the level of set-
tlement account balances was now weaker than earlier. The low
level of deposit maturities narrowed considerably banks’ room for
manoeuvre, with the banking sector becoming more sensitive in the
face of liquidity shocks.
Maturity mismatches
developed
December is a special month from the perspective of interbank
liquidity for two reasons. First, the demand for cash jumps due to the
Christmas holiday. Second, the within-month seasonal patterns of
tax payments are different and the high number of bank holidays
makes it difficult to manage liquidity. As a consequence, the placing
of deposits became uneven, with large concentrations around the
end of the month.
Speculation on inter-
est rate reduction
Expectations of an official interest rate reduction intensified in
the market in the early days of January. The three-month bench-
mark yield fell 80 basis points within a space of one week relative to
its December level. At that time, the rate on the 28-day NBH deposit
was some 1.9 percentage points higher than the discount treasury
bill yield. Banks, availing themselves of the opportunity, placed
some HUF 100 billion more deposits with the Bank than the amount
of maturing deposits at the first three operations of the instrument.
(On 8 January, the NBH reduced interest rates by 75 basis points.)
Liquidity shortage in
the interbank market
Robust flows into deposits at the beginning of the month and the
unexpected, swift increase in KESZ caused a liquidity shortage in the
interbank market. This meant that the banking system could not have
been able to meet the reserve requirements in the January mainte-
nance period, had it not borrowed from the Bank or had there not been
further intervention in the foreign exchange market. Recognising this,
from 11 January banks stepped up steadily their outstanding repos
and foreign exchange swaps, which exceeded HUF 60–70 billion per-
manently following the 14
th. The size of liquidity shortage was so high
in the middle of the maintenance period that, had the authorities not
conducted interventions at the ceiling of the exchange rate band, the
banking sector could have satisfied the reserve requirement only by
borrowing a daily HUF 70–80 billion in repo.
Several banks ex-
hausted their the
repo limit, so the
overnight rate rose
above the repo rate
The banking sector had a total repo and swap limit of HUF 110
billion in January 1999, so, in principle, the system’s repo limit
would have been enough to manage the liquidity shortage. However,
the liquidity shortage affected banks fairly unevenly, with a number
of them exhausting their limits. As a consequence, these banks had
to borrow in central bank repo through other banks, so the interbank
overnight rate hovered above the repo rate for several days (see
Chart 11).
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tender: restore the ef-
fectiveness of the in-
terest rate corridor
In order to restore the effectiveness of the overnight interest
rate corridor, on 21 January the Bank provided HUF 25 billion and
on 26 January HUF 20.7 billion surplus liquidity to the banking
system via quick tender. The maturities of both transactions coin-
cided with the end of the maintenance period, their rate being equal
to the repo rate. All financial institutions that were counterparties of
the Bank had the opportunity to submit their bids for unlimited
amounts. The pre-announced quantity was allocated as a proportion
of bids submitted. As a result of the two quick tenders, the liquidity
shortage eased, and the overnight rate returned into the interest rate
corridor.
The rate on the funds offered equalled the repo rate. Thus,
comparing it with the situation in which this liquidity could have been
allocated to banks under repo, the execution of the quick tender did
not affect the earnings potential of the banking system. However,
with banks obtaining central bank refinancing above their repo lim-
its, the rearrangement of income among banks ceased due to the
use of indirect repo.
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Outstanding amounts in quick tenders (right-hand scale)
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Interest rate corridor (left-hand scale)
Overnight rate (left-hand scale)
HUF billions Per cent
Chart 11
The interbank overnight rate and outstanding repo
in January 19992.6.3 The two-week deposit tender
Switch over to
two-week tenders
From November 2000 until end-March 2001, commercial banks
were allowed to place two-week deposits with the authorities up to
the limit announced by the Bank; and the earlier periodical avail-
ability was replaced by standard weekly deposit tenders. The Bank
announced a maximum amount to be allotted and a ceiling rate at
the tender operations. Later, the role of the major policy rate was
played by the ceiling rate announced at the tenders. The Bank ac-
cepted the bids received for the tenders with the yield specified in
the bids, in a rising order of yields, up to the maximum amount an-
nounced.
The technique of the two-week deposit tender showed much resemblance with
the main refinancing operations of the ECB. Until June 2000, the basis for the
allocation of the ECB’s two-week refinancing loan was the amounts submitted
for the auctions. The modification to this system was motivated by speculation
on an interest rate raise by the ECB, as, following the tenfold oversubscription
in 1999, oversubscriptions were thirty times as much in the first five months of
2000 and hundred times as much at the latest two of such auctions. Beginning
from June 2000, the ECB has announced the amount and floor rate at the refi-
nancing tenders, while it has accepted the bids in a decreasing order of rates,
up to the announced amount. The opposing features of tender techniques ap-
plied by the NBH and the ECB (setting maximum and minimum rates, the ar-
rangement of bids etc.) can be traced to the fact that, whereas the ECB auc-






Each week the Bank announced different amounts at the de-
posit tenders. The most important argument in favour of announcing
different quantities was that commercial banks smoothed out the ef-
fect of liquidity shocks on settlement account balances within main-
tenance periods prior to the introduction of the deposit tender
scheme by placing two-week deposits. When determining the
amounts to be allotted, the guiding principle was to maintain the
ability of banks to manage intra maintenance period liquidity
shocks.
The most important tools of daily liquidity management in this
system were the reserve averaging provision and the interbank mar-
ket. The Bank did not eliminate, but rather reduced, the expected
fluctuations in liquidity by offering varying amounts at the deposit
tenders. This meant that the volatility of the reserve account balance
was allowed to be lower than in the case of equal amounts, owing to
the announcement of varying amounts. When determining the
amounts to be allotted, an important expectation from the offered
amounts was to give banks an opportunity to offset liquidity shocks
and to reduce interbank rate volatility as well.
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was to estimate the expected monthly average of two-week depos-
its, and the combined daily outturns for the settlement account bal-
ances and the two-week deposit stock. These two indicators were
estimated on the basis of a daily forecast of the KESZ and cash hold-
ings, while assuming unchanged holdings of NBH bills and zero for-
eign exchange market intervention.
Several factors argued in favour of ignoring foreign exchange
market intervention when forecasting the two-week deposit stock.
First, forecasting foreign exchange market intervention on a daily basis
is problematic. Second, permanent liquidity surpluses, i.e. those lasting
for longer than the maintenance period, arising from foreign exchange
market intervention at the ceiling of the exchange rate band, could feed
through to an equal increase in NBH bill holdings.
The amounts to be
deposited were set in





As a next step, the amounts to be deposited were decided in a
way to ensure that, given the average of two-week deposits expected
for a maintenance period, the difference between banks’ weekly av-
erage settlement account balances and the monthly average should
be kept to the minimum. This meant that, when announcing the
quantities, the Bank attempted to allow the variations in the average
settlement account balance to be as small as possible from one allot-




The monthly outturn for the two-week deposit stock which
gives the smoothest path for meeting required reserves is the one
which smoothes out the effect of exogenous liquidity shocks the
most. Having developed this, the announced amounts were adjusted
for the possible maximum of the monthly average of two-week de-
posits to be the value which the Bank had set as a maximum limit.
For example, this value was HUF 400 billion in November–Decem-
ber 2000. This meant that, if banks had placed deposits in the
amount as announced by the Bank, then an average deposit stock of
HUF 400 billion would have developed (see Chart 12).
The objective with the announcement of the amounts five
weeks ahead was to aid banks’ forward-looking liquidity manage-
ment practices. But it had negative implications for the efficiency of
smoothing between the individual weeks. It stemmed from the im-
perfect liquidity programming and from the fact that the announce-
ment five weeks ahead did not allow the Bank to react to situations in
which the demand at tenders was very different from what the Bank
earlier estimated. Net deposit-making (deposit-making less matur-
ing deposits) determine commercial banks’ settlement account bal-
ances, rather than deposit-making. Therefore, bidding for deposits
at an auction executed two weeks previously influenced bidding at a
given auction as well.
52 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS AT THE NBHAppendix 1
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 53





















Maximum two-week deposit stock Actual two-week deposit stock
Average two-week deposit stock Total stock of liquidity




























Liguidity position of the banking sector, November–December 2000*
* The upper lines represent the banking systems’ daily and weekly average liquidity (the
sumofthesettlementaccountbalanceandthetwo-weekdepositstock).Theweeklyaverages
apply to the period Wednesday through Tuesday, in order for the weekly outturns for liquidity
to be comparable with banks’ deposit-making and the amounts announced by the Bank. The
curve fluctuating between HUF 500–700 billion shows the outturn for the sum of the settle-
ment account balance and the overnight deposit. The lower third of the table includes the ma-
jor data relating to the two-week deposit stock.Statistics for regression used to forecast
overnight rates
T
he position of overnight rates within the band (RELPOZ) was es-
timated using the liquidity indicator (LIKV) and the effective re-
serve surpluses (SZSTAT3). In contrast with the indicator denoted
with ,the variable SZSTAT3 defined effective reserve surpluses as a
percentage of average reserve requirement during the remaining












The liquidity indicator is expressed in HUF billions and the ac-
tual reserve surplus is expressed in percentages.
Using their position within the interest rate corridor, we normal-
ised the nominal values of overnight rates to values falling between
0 and 1 (RELPOZ, the value of the variable is zero, if the overnight
rate equals the overnight deposit rate; and it is 1, if it equals the repo
rate). As the relationship between the rates and the explanatory vari-
ables is not linear, and because the values of the explained variable
fall within the interval noted above, we estimated the regression with
the non-linear least squares method – we ‘converted’ the value
derived by the linear combination of the explanatory variables into
the (0, 1) interval with the distribution function of logistical distribu-
tion.
The t-statistics of the coefficients calculated by the programme
package are very high expressed in absolute terms; however, based
on the auto-correlation in the residual (even with the correction
employed), the standard errors calculated on the basis of the prog-
ramme package are not reliable. The residual tests clearly demon-
strate the high level of auto-correlation inherent in the error term.
This suggests that the above regression does not include all factors
which affect developments in overnight rates. The liquidity indicator
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Appendicesand the level of effective reserve surpluses, therefore, are not the
only determinants of developments in interbank rates; however,
based on the high R
2 nearly a half of volatility can be related to
these factors. The interpretation of the regression coefficients is also
made more difficult by the presumed simultaneity between the vari-
ables.
The statistics of the regression written for the overnight rate
show a better fit, if a delayed value of the explained variable is also
included within the regressors. However, this causes the disadvan-
tage that the delayed endogenous variables take over the role of the
missing explanatory variables – there is an improvement in the ex-
planatory power only in econometric terms, but it does not explain
more in economic terms than the previous estimate. In the case of
the regression containing the delayed endogenous variable, we in-
serted with a dummy the first working day of the month (DUM), and
the days remaining in the maintenance period (NAPOK) into the ex-
planatory variables.
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Table D
Statistics of the regression applied to estimating the overnight rate
(Eviews)
Explained variable: RELPOZ
Estimating method: Least squares; Newey-West HAC correction used to calculate stan-
dard errors (truncation parameter = 5)
Number of observations: 613
Estimated equation:
RELPOZ=LOGISTIC[C(1)+C(2)*LIKV+C(3)*SZSTAT3]
Coefficient Standard error t-statistics Probability
C(1) 0.459957 0.169750 2.709620 0.0069
C(2) –0.016708 0.003710 –4.503992 0.0000
C(3) –4.462110 0.577778 –7.722880 0.0000
R-square 0.419497 F-statistics 220.4061
Correct
R-square 0.417593 Probability (F-statistics) 0.000000
Standard
error
of regression 0.181095 Durbin–Watson-statistics 0.633007OCCASIONAL PAPERS 57
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Table E
Statistics of retrogression containing delayed endogenous variable
Explained variable: RELPOZ
Estimating method: Least squares; Newey-West HAC correction used to calculate stan-
dard errors (truncation parameter = 5)
Number of observations: 587
RELPOZ=LOGISTIC[C(1)+C(2)*LIKV+C(3)*SZSTAT3)+C(4)
*RELPOZ(-1) + C(5)*DUM+C(6)*NAPOK]
Coefficient Standard error t-statistics Probability
C(1) –1.538763 0.243255 –6.325726 0.0000
C(2) –0.018268 0.002708 –6.745365 0.0000
C(3) –6.078737 0.995793 –6.104419 0.0000
C(4) 0.702480 0.037557 18.70448 0.0000
C(5) 0.218207 0.044482 4.905483 0.0000
C(6) 0.001569 0.000730 2.149822 0.0320
R-square 0.806075 Durbin–Watson-statistics 1.689.100
Correct
R-square 0.804406 F-statistics 482.9994
Standard
error
of regression 0.105164 Probability (F-statistics) 0.00000058 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
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